Environmental Regulation, Bargaining Power of Enterprises and Green Total Factor Productivity
- LI Pengsheng &CHEN Yanying
- Dalian University of Technology, 116024.
In this paper, the Luenberger productivity index method based on relaxed directional distance function is used to calculate the green total factor productivity of the key surveyed enterprises that are industrial pollution sources in the national “environmental statistical reporting system”. On this basis, the dynamic influence mechanism of environmental regulation on corporate green total factor productivity is investigated, and the heterogeneous influencing factors of corporate green total factor productivity are explored from the perspective of the bargaining power of enterprises. The empirical results show that environmental regulation will reduce the green total factor productivity of enterprises in the short run, but promote it in the long run and form the dynamic green total factor productivity effect of environmental regulation. The higher the industrial output value, the more taxes paid and the more employees hired, the bigger role the polluting enterprises have in the performance appraisal of local economy and officials and the stronger bargaining power they have against the government in the process of implementing environmental regulation, which can free them from strict environmental regulation, and thus reduce the dynamic green total factor productivity effect of environmental regulation. When the political relevance of enterprises is high or the political constraints of their cities are weak, the bargaining power of the enterprises will be enlarged and the dynamic green total factor productivity effect of environmental regulation will be further weakened. The government should maintain the sustainability of the implementation of environmental regulations and avoid one-off law enforcement; increase the weight of environmental performance assessment, solve the incompatibility between the central government's objectives and local incentives; continue to promote the reform of vertical management of environmental protection and the central government's environmental supervision system, and weaken the intervention of local governments in the implementation of environmental regulations.
JEL：L51, Q51, Q58
- Environmental Regulation, Bargaining Power of Enterprises, Green Total Factor Productivity, Data Envelopment Analysis