Is the Power of Example Infinite in Group Actions——Evidence from a Dynamic Public Goods Experiment
- ZHANG Yuanpeng, ZHANG Haochen
- Peking University
In the study of group actions, we attach importance to the exemplary role of the model leader. In this paper, we add leading mechanism to the classic public goods experiment framework, focusing on the impact of the exemplary role of the leader on the performance of public goods contribution. Similar to most research results, our study shows that: compared to the case without leadership, the existing of leaders significantly improved the public goods contribution performance; and as for the mechanisms to select a leader, taking turns and election produce significantly more public goods contribution than randomly generating the leader. Moreover, our study also shows that the heterogeneity of personal social preference has a significant influence on public goods contribution results. Conditional cooperators and subjects with “hump-shaped” preference contribute more than free riders, while the democratic election mechanism to determine the leader helps to weaken the free riders' speculation.
- Social Preference，Leading Mechanism，Voluntary Contribution of Public Goods，Experimental Economics